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The minority game is an important example of a non-cooperative n-person game, which can be applied on different
situations with social and economic contexts. We analysed the minority game as an elementary trafﬁc scenario in which
human participants had to choose 100 times between a road A and a road B. In each period, the road, which was chosen by
the minority of players won. At ﬁrst view, there seems to be no outstandingly advisable strategy for the participants to
enhance their payoffs because both roads have the same properties. However, an important observation is that the number
of road changes of a participant is negatively correlated to his/her cumulative payoff. On average, subjects with high
numbers of road changes received less money than participants who stoically chose the same road. Furthermore one could
increase the coordination of the players by providing the players distribution on both roads in the last period.
r 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The minority game is an important example of a n-person game with no pure equilibria and can be applied
on different situations with social and economic contexts. The minority game, which is also called the El Farol
Bar Problem, was introduced by Arthur [1] and theoretically analysed in detail by [2,3].
The rules of the minority game can be described in a short way: a number of agents n have to choose in
several periods whether to enter room A or B. Those agents who chose the less crowded room win whereas the
others lose.2. Experimental setup
For this paper, the minority problem was transferred to a route choice context. We did minority game
experiments at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn. A number of
experiments on route choice behaviour (e.g. [4,5]) were already reported. Here we focus on the route choice ine front matter r 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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volatile decision dynamics far from optimal payoff distribution was observed in route choice experiments.
They showed that speciﬁc guidance strategies are able to increase the performance of all users by reducing
overreaction and stabilizing the decision dynamics.
In Ref. [8], a model for the behaviour of drivers in a city for analysing the emergent collective behaviour was
discussed. They found that in absence of information noise, inductive drivers turn out to behave better than
random drivers for low car densities, while at high densities the opposite occurs.
Our aim is to present minority game experiments with a large number of periods and with sufﬁciently many
independent observations for meaningful applications of non-parametric signiﬁcance tests.
In these experiments, subjects were told that in each of the 100 periods, they had to make a choice between a
road A and road B for travelling from X to Y (Fig. 1).
The number of subjects in each session was 9. They were told that the travel times tA and tB on road A and B
depended on the numbers nA and nB of participants choosing A and B, respectively:
tA ¼ 1; tB ¼ 03nAonB and tB ¼ 1; tA ¼ 03nA4nB.
The period payoff was tA if A was chosen and tB if B was chosen. The total payoff of a subject was the sum
of all 100 period payoffs converted proportionally to money payoffs in Euro. Two treatments were
investigated. In treatment I, each subject received information whether the last of his own choices was shared
by the minority or majority of the participants. In treatment II, additional feedback was provided about the
distribution of participants on both routes in the last period. Six sessions were run with treatments I and II,
respectively. No further information was given to the subjects. It seems that especially in treatment I, there is
no outstandingly advisable strategy for the participants to enhance their payoffs because due to the symmetry
of the game, each road has the same properties. However, one can see that in some cases, the number of road
changes of participants has a signiﬁcant effect on their cumulative payoff at the end of the experiment.
Fig. 2 shows the number of participants on road A as a function of time for a typical session of treatments I
and II. The mean number of players on road A is 4.5 in treatment I and 4.43 in treatment II. This was expected
since due to the experimental setup, there is no preference for one road.Fig. 1. Participants had to choose between a road A and a road B.
Fig. 2. Number of participants on A: a typical session of treatments I and II.
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The non-existence of pure strategy equilibria poses a coordination problem, which may be one of the
reasons for non-convergence and the persistence of ﬂuctuations in both treatments.
3.1. Cumulative payoff
The additional feedback in treatment II about the distribution of the players on both roads in the last period
increases the cumulative payoff of participants. In Table 1 one can see for each treatment the average of
cumulative payoff. The mean payoff in treatment II is signiﬁcantly higher than in treatment I. The null-
hypothesis can be rejected by a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney-Test on the signiﬁcance level of 1% (one sided).
3.2. Fluctuations
Furthermore, the information in treatment II has a beneﬁcial effect on the number of ﬂuctuations, which is
reduced. The ﬂuctuations per period can be measured by the standard deviation of the number of participants
choosing A per period. The standard deviation of each treatment is listed in Table 1. The ﬂuctuations are
obviously larger in treatment I than in treatment II. The effect is signiﬁcant. The null-hypothesis is rejected by
a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney-Test on the signiﬁcance level of 1% (one sided).
3.3. Road changes
The reduction of ﬂuctuations in treatment II could also be measured by the number of road changes per
period. As one can see in Table 1, the mean number of road changes is signiﬁcantly higher in treatment I. The
null-hypothesis is rejected by the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney-Test on a level of 1% (one-sided).
In treatment II, subjects are informed about the distribution of players on both roads in the last period. This
seems to be the reason for the greater number of road changes and also for the stronger ﬂuctuations in
treatment I. Feedback on the distribution of the players on both roads in the last period signiﬁcantly reduces
ﬂuctuations and the number of road changes in treatment II compared to treatment I. The reason of the higher
number of road changes and worse coordination of the players may be the lack of information in treatment I.Table 1
Experimental results: treatments I and II
Cumulative payoff Number of players on A Number of road changes Road changes vs. cumulative payoff
Mean Mean Std. dev. Mean Spearman rank correlation
Treatment I
Session I 01 37.33 4.33 1.36 5.08 0.48
Session I 02 36.22 4.74 1.50 3.87 0.34
Session I 03 36.67 4.41 1.50 5.16 0.44
Session I 04 38.00 4.40 1.31 5.19 0.70
Session I 05 37.67 4.65 1.33 5.28 0.18
Session I 06 38.44 4.44 1.28 4.35 0.18
Treatment I 37.89 4.50 1.38 4.82 0.27
Treatment II
Session II 01 37.89 4.19 1.35 3.99 0.51
Session II 02 38.89 4.62 1.19 3.68 0.54
Session II 03 40.78 4.36 1.05 3.67 0.30
Session II 04 41.22 4.34 0.97 5.19 0.82
Session II 05 42.44 4.62 0.84 4.67 0.27
Session II 06 43.33 4.50 0.67 4.44 0.78
Treatment II 40.76 4.44 1.01 4.27 0.54
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Fig. 3. Scatter diagram of cumulative payoff/number of road changes: treatments I and II.
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road changes per period and therefore determine more precisely the behaviour of the other players.
4. Negative correlations between cumulative payoffs and road changes
In all sessions except one of treatment I, the number of road changes of a subject is negatively correlated
with the subject’s payoff. Fig. 3 shows the negative correlation between the payoff and the number of road
changes.
This effect could also be seen by calculating the Spearman rank correlation between cumulative payoffs and
the number of road changes for each treatment as shown in Table 1. The mean number of the Spearman rank
correlation coefﬁcients in treatment I is .27 and in treatment II .54. In 11 observations of both the
treatments, the Spearman rank correlations between cumulative payoffs and the number of road changes are
negative. This is a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the total number of road changes and the size of
ﬂuctuations.
On average, subjects with high numbers of road changes received less money than participants who stoically
chose the same road. In treatment II, this effect is stronger than in treatment I. In treatment I, road changes
may serve the purpose of gathering information about the behaviour of the other players. This motivation has
no basis in treatment II because each participant is informed about the distribution of players in former
periods. However, road changes may also be attempted to improve payoffs. The ﬁnding of a negative
correlation between a subject’s payoff and the number of road changes suggests that on average, such attempts
are not successful.References
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